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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Casting Light on the Gray Area: An Analysis
of the Use of Neutral Pronouns in Non-
Testifying Codefendant Redacted Confessions
Under Bruton, Richardson, and Gray
I. INTRODUCTION
Deciding when and how to admit a non-testifying codefendant con-
fession at a joint trial has troubled Courts for many years. This problem
can best be illustrated by using the hypothetical provided in this section.
The police obtain a confession from Stewart, who will not testify at his
joint trial. Stewart's confession implicates himself and his codefend-
ants: John, Bob, Harry, and Sam. Furthermore, Stewart describes how
the heroin was imported and the role of each in the conspiracy.
There are two evidentiary problems with the admission of Stewart's
confession at the defendants' joint trial. First, the confession is hearsay
as defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 801, because it is an out of
Court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Hear-
say is inadmissible unless the statement falls into a specific heresay
exception. An example of an exception is Federal Rule of Evidence
803(b)(4) which allows statements against penal interest made by an
unavailable declarant to be admissible.' Since Stewart will be unavaila-
ble to testify at trial, and because the statement here subjects Stewart to
criminal liability, it appears to be a statement against penal interest. At
least the portion of Stewart's statement against his interest would there-
fore seem to be admissible against Stewart under Rule 804(b)(3). Stew-
art's statement, however, not only implicates Stewart, but each of his
codefendants as well by describing how the heroin was imported and the
role of each person in the conspiracy. In Williamson v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that Rule 804(b)(3) does not allow the admis-
sion statements incriminating someone other than the declarant, even if
they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpa-
tory.3 In the hypothetical, Stewart confessed to his role in the conspir-
acy. Stewart did so, however, by describing the roles of his
codefendants in the conspiracy, effectively shifting some of the blame to
1. FED. R. EVID. 801.
2. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) states:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true.
3. 512 U.S. 594, 599-601 (1994).
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them. Thus, because Stewart's confession not only incriminates himself
but also his codefendants, his statement is not totally self-inculpatory
and therefore the non-incriminating portion is not admissible under Rule
804(b)(3) 4
The second evidentiary problem with admitting Stewart's confes-
sion is that its admission violates Stewart's codefendants' rights under
the Confrontation Clause.5 The Confrontation Clause requires that an
accused have the right to confront all witnesses against him.6 Therefore,
because Stewart will exercise his right not to testify, his confession is
inadmissible against his codefendants as they will not be able to con-
front him through cross-examination. However, this does not mean that
his confession will not be admitted into evidence at the joint trial. Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 105 allows for limited admissibility of evidence.
It states, "[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the Court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly." 7 Applying this rule, the trial
judge could admit Stewart's entire confession into evidence, and upon
request, could instruct the jury in this manner:
There has been evidence that Defendant Stewart may have given a
statement to the authorities. You may consider any such statement of
Defendant Stewart, however, only in deciding the charge(s) against
him and not in deciding the charge(s) against any other defendant.
You may consider the statement of Defendant Stewart in the
charge(s) against Defendant Stewart and give it such weight as you
feel it deserves. You may not consider or even discuss that statement
in any way when you are deciding if the government has proven its
case against any other defendant.8
The problem here is that if the jury hears Stewart's confession in its
totality implicating each of his codefendants by name and deed, it is
unlikely that the jury will be able to follow this instruction, and it will
prejudiced his codefendants.
This issue was presented in Bruton v. United States, where a non-
testifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant by
describing his role in the crime was admitted into evidence at their joint
4. For a further discussion on Lilly v. Virginia, see Jennifer Christianson, Comment,
Statements Against Interest Under Lilly, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 891 (2001).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. The Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
7. FED. R. EVID. 105.
8. KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 11.11 (5 ed.
2000).
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trial. 9 The confession referred to the defendant by his proper name and
was accompanied by a limiting instruction that the evidence was only to
be used against the confessor.' 0 The Supreme Court held that the admis-
sion of the non-testifying codefendant's confession that implicated the
defendant violated the defendant's right of cross-examination under the
Confrontation Clause. "
After Bruton, an alternative to offering the confession in its original
form would be to redact Stewart's confession so that it does not mention
his codefendants by name. This method is more protective of his code-
fendants' constitutional rights of confrontation because the jury may not
initially be able to determine who the co-conspirators were and what
their respective roles in the conspiracy were. However, because there
are different methods of redaction the question as to, whether the Con-
frontation Clause is violated may depend on the method and the extent
of the redaction.' 2 In Richardson v. Marsh, a confession that was
redacted in a manner that removed all references to the defendant's
name and existence was held to not violate the Confrontation Clause.' 3
Recently, in Gray v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court
held that a redacted confession where the defendant's name was
replaced with the term "deleted" was unconstitutional.' 4 If Stewart's
confession is redacted, however, in a manner in which his codefendant's
proper names are removed and are replaced with neutral pronouns, such
as "another individual" or "they," is the Sixth Amendment violated?
The answer to this question depends on the jurisdiction. As this Com-
ment will discuss, federal and state courts interpret of this line of Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence differently.
An alternative to using a redacted confession would be for the pros-
ecutor to refrain from offering Stewart's confession at trial. This is
surely not the prosecutor's preferred option, however, since "the defen-
dant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evi-
dence that can be admitted against him."' 5 Furthermore, even with the
admission of a redacted confession, the prosecutor will surely benefit
from a spill over effect. The jury will be instructed by the judge not to
9. 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968).
10. Id. at 125.
11. Id. at 126.
12. The amount of protection would depend on the method of redaction. The author believes
that the most protective method of redaction is to omit all references to other co-conspirators.
Other less protective methods of redaction that have commonly been used include using neutral
pronouns, using letters such as "person X", and using "deleted" to signify a redacted name or
term.
13. 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
14. 523 U.S. 185, 188 (1998).
15. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139 (White, J., dissenting).
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consider the redacted evidence against anyone other than the confessor,
but this does not change the fact that they already heard the confession
that implicates more than one individual. While the limiting instruction
offers some protection, there is no guarantee that the jury will follow
this instruction. Furthermore, the jurors cannot erase from their minds
what has been exposed to them, and even if a juror tries to follow the
instruction, it remains embedded in his or her subconscious and may
nonetheless permeate their thought process. Thus, it will be beneficial
for the prosecutor to find a constitutional means to admit the redacted
confession at the joint trial.
The codefendants are afforded a possible way out of this situation
by filing a motion for severance under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 16 Most courts, however, are reluctant to grant these
motions and the joint trial usually continues with the admission of a
redacted confession accompanied by a limiting instruction, if requested
by the codefendant(s). A question remains if Stewart's codefendants are
truly afforded their rights under the Confrontation Clause in this
hypothetical.
This Comment will first briefly discuss the use of joint trials and
courts' reluctance to grant motions to sever under Rule 14. Second, the
Comment will discuss and analyze the Supreme Court cases that define
the scope of a codefendant's constitutional protection under the Con-
frontation Clause: Bruton, Richardson, and Gray.'7 Third, the Comment
will look at the problems that remain unresolved by Bruton and its prog-
eny, specifically the use of singular and plural neutral pronouns in
redacted confessions. Fourth, the Comment will argue why confessions
that replace a codefendant's name with a neutral pronoun violate the
Bruton rule. Fifth, the Comment will discuss and evaluate the viable
options that would remedy this situation. Sixth, the Comment will dis-
cuss and apply a limiting instruction to be used in conjunction with con-
fessions redacted in a manner that removes all references to the
codefendants, thereby creating a workable standard that is more protec-
tive of non-confessing codefendants' constitutional rights of confronta-
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 states:
Relief from Prejudicial Joinder:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in a indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a
severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling
on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the
government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or
confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at the trial.
17. Id.
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tion. The Comment will also discuss where the solution is not practical
under certain circumstances because of the risk of distortion. In conclu-
sion, the Comment will contend that while there may be no perfect rem-
edy to this problem, courts should make a real attempt to balance an
accused's constitutional rights with judicial economy by requiring that
redacted codefendant confessions omit all references to the existence of
non-confessing codefendants, where practicable.
II. THE INSEVERABILITY OF JOINT TRIALS
Joinder of defendants is governed by Rules 8(b) and 14 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8(b) provides that defendants
may be charged together "if they are alleged to have participated in the
same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions con-
stituting an offense or offenses."18 Rule 14 permits a district court to
grant a severance of defendants if "it appears that a defendant or the
government is prejudiced by the joinder."' 9 In Zafiro v. United States,
the Supreme Court declared that there is a preference in the federal sys-
tem for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.2° Zafiro
held that severance under Rule 14 should be granted "only if there is a
serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of
one of the defendants."'" The Court, citing Bruton, stated that "evidence
that is probative of a defendant's guilt but technically admissible only
against a codefendant might present a risk of prejudice" that would
require severance.22 The Court, however, also stated that, as they "indi-
cated in Richardson, less drastic measures, such as limiting instruc-
tions," most often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.23
In Delli Paoli v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that the
benefits of joint proceedings should not have to be sacrificed by requir-
ing separate trials in order to use the confession against the declarant.24
Joint trials save government funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses
and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of
crime to trial. In Richardson, the Court stated that joint trials play a vital
role in the criminal justice system.2 The Richardson Court found that
they promote efficiency and serve the interests of justice by avoiding the
18. FED. R. CRIM P. 8(b).
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
20. 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993).
21. Id. at 539.
22. Id. at 539.
23. Id.
24. 352 U.S. 232 (1979).
25. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209.
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scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.216 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly approved of joint trials. 27 These reasons,
however, while convincing, support a preference for judicial economy
over constitutional rights.
As cited by the Bruton majority, Justice Lehman's dissent in Peo-
ple v. Fisher warned that judicial economy should not be favored over a
defendant's constitutional rights.28 Since the "presumption against sev-
ering properly joined cases is strong, 29 this Comment will not focus on
severance issues, but instead on the creation of a workable standard to
be used in cases where a non-testifying codefendant's confession is
admitted at his joint trial and severance is denied. This, however, does
not suggest that severance is never granted or should never be granted.30
If a defendant's specific trial right would be compromised by a joint
trial, the defendant should always request a severance under Rule 14.
III. BRUTON AND ITS PROGENY
A. Bruton v. United States
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court decided Bruton. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, held that the admission of a non-testi-
fying codefendant's confession that implicated the defendant violated
his right of confrontation. 3' Bruton overruled Delli Paoli, which held
that it was reasonably possible for the jury to follow sufficiently clear
limiting instructions to disregard the confessor's extra-judicial statement
implicating his codefendant in the crime.32 In Bruton, Evans and Bruton
were both convicted by a jury on a federal charge of armed postal rob-
bery.3 3 At the joint trial, "a postal inspector testified that Evans orally
confessed to him that Evans and [Bruton] committed the armed rob-
26. Id. at 210.
27. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537-38 (1993) (citations omitted).
28. "We still adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to confrontation of the witnesses
against him and the right to cross-examine them ... We destroy the age-old rule which in the past
has been regarded as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence by a legalistic formula, required
of the judge, that the jury may not consider any admissions against any party who did not join in
them. We secure greater speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the
price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too high." Richardson, 481
U.S. at 218 (quoting People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928)).
29. United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1143 (8th Cir. 1996).
30. United States v. Mayfield, 189 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding in an abuse of
discretion to not sever trial where defendant was denied specific trial right of confrontation and
where co-defendant's mutually exclusive defense prevented the jury from making a reliable
judgment about appellant guilt or innocence).
31. Id. at 126.
32. See Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 239, 242.
33. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124.
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bery."3 4 While Evans's conviction was reversed on appeal because his
confession was inappropriately admitted at trial, Bruton's conviction
was affirmed." The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied on
Delli Paoli and found that because the trial judge instructed the jury that
Evans's confession was inadmissible hearsay against Bruton, it "there-
fore had to be disregarded in determining [Bruton's] guilt or
innocence."36
In analyzing the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's ruling,
the Supreme Court first looked to cases that it had decided since Delli
Paoli. In 1965, the Court decided in Pointer v. Texas, that the Sixth
Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause.37 Later that same year, the Court applied Pointer in
Douglas v. Alabama, where two defendants, Loyd and Douglas were
tried separately. 38 After Loyd was tried and found guilty, he was called
by the state as a witness against Douglas. 39 Loyd invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination and refused to answer any questions.4" The
prosecutor then read from Loyd's confession in order to refresh his rec-
ollection.4' The Court held that Douglas's inability to cross-examine
Loyd denied Douglas "the right to cross-examine secured by the Con-
frontation Clause."4 The Court found the case in Bruton to be an even
greater violation of a defendant's right to confrontation than the case in
Douglas because the jury read testimony about Evans confession and it
was actually in evidence.43 Since the evidence was properly before the
jury during its deliberations, there was an even greater chance that the
jury would believe that Evans made the statements and that they were
true."4 The Court reasoned that this added substantial weight to the gov-
ernment's case in a form not subject to cross-examination.45
The Court next supported its decision in Bruton by drawing a paral-
lel to Jackson v. Denno.4 6 Discussing Jackson, the Court stated that a
"defendant is constitutionally entitled to have the trial judge first deter-




37. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403.
38. Id. at 416.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 416-17.
42. Id. at 419.
43. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 127-28.
46. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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the jury for an assessment of its credibility. '47 In Jackson, the Court
"expressly rejected the proposition that a jury, when determining the
confessor's guilt, could be relied on to ignore his confession of guilt
should it find the confession involuntary. '48  The Court discussed how
its opinion in Jackson was supported by Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Delli Paoli, which challenged Delli Paoli's premise "that a properly
instructed jury would ignore the confessor's inculpation of the noncon-
fessor in determining the latter's guilt. '49 The Court found that "the
message of Jackson for Delli Paoli was clear."50 This message was sug-
gested by Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Aranda, which held that a
jury cannot determine that a confession is true insofar as it admits that A
has committed criminal acts with B and at the same time effectively
ignore the inevitable conclusion that B has committed those same crimi-
nal acts against A.51
The Bruton Court also found that in addition to Jackson, the 1966
amendment to Rule 14 also demonstrated the Court's repudiation of
47. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 (discussing Jackson).
48. Id.
49. Id. The Court cited Frankfurter's dissent in Delli Paoli:
The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is
intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such nonadmissible declaration cannot
be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition becomes a futile collocation
of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against whom
such a declaration should not tell.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129 (citing Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 247).
50. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128.
51. The Bruton court noted:
Although Jackson was directly concerned with obviating any risk that a jury
might rely on an unconstitutionally obtained confession in determining the
defendant's guilt, its logic extends to obviating the risks that the jury may rely on
any inadmissible statements. If it is a denial of due process to rely on a jury's
presumed ability to disregard an involuntary confession, it may also be a denial of
due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard a codefendant's
confession implicating another defendant when it is determining that defendant's
guilt or innocence.
Indeed, the latter task may be an even more difficult one for the jury to perform
than the former. Under the New York procedure, which Jackson held violated due
process, the jury was only required to disregard a confession it found to be
involuntary. If it made such a finding, then the confession was presumably out of
the case. In joint trials, however, when the admissible confession of one defendant
inculpates another defendant, the confession is never deleted from the case and the
jury is expected to perform the overwhelming task of considering it in determining
the guilt or innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring it in determining the
guilt or innocence of any codefendants of the declarant. A jury cannot 'segregate
evidence into separate intellectual boxes.' . . . It cannot determine that a confession
is true insofar as it admits that A has committed criminal acts with B and at the
same time effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that B has committed those
same criminal acts with A.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 130-31, (citing Aranda, 407 P.2d at 270-72).
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Delli Paoli's basic premise.52 The Advisory Committee explained the
amendment by stating:
A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission in evidence against
a codefendant of a statement or confession made by that codefendant.
This prejudice cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the code-
fendant does not take the stand. Limiting instruction to the jury may
not in fact erase the prejudice . . . 53
In rejecting the use of limiting instructions in this area, the Court
stated that while the prosecution should "not be denied the benefit of the
confession to prove the confessor's guilt," "alternative ways exist to
achieve that benefit without an infringement of the nonconfessor's right
of confrontation."54 Thus, the Court declared that "where viable alterna-
tives do exist, it is deceptive to rely on the pursuit of truth to defend a
clearly harmful practice. 55 In a footnote, the Court noted that "some
courts have required deletion of references to codefendants where practi-
cable," but also cited law review articles that suggested that redaction is
ineffective.56 It further recognized that, as in the case of Evans's confes-
sion, "where the confession is offered in evidence by means of oral testi-
mony, redaction is patently impractical. 5 7
In his dissent, Justice White criticized the majority for not
"spell[ing] out how the federal courts might conduct their business con-
sistent with [the majority's] opinion."58 He presumed that under the
holding in Bruton it would be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial con-
fessions unless all portions of them implicating defendants other than
the declarant are effectively deleted.59 He stated that "[e]ffective dele-
tion will probably require not only omission of all direct and indirect
inculpations of codefendants but also of any statement that could be
employed against those defendants once their identity is otherwise estab-
lished."6 He also stressed "the deletion must not be such that it will
distort the statements to the substantial prejudice of either the declarant
52. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131.
53. Id. at 132 (citing advisory committee's note).
54. Id. at 133.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 134 n.10.
57. Id. at 134-35, n.10 (citing Note, Codefendants' Confessions 3 COLUM. J. L. & Soc.
PROBS., June 1967, at 80, 88):
"Where the confession is offered in evidence by means of oral testimony, redaction
is patently impractical. To expect a witness to relate X's confession without
including any of its references to Y is to ignore human frailty. Again, it is unlikely
that an intentional or accidental slip by the witness could be remedied by
instructions to disregard." Id.
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or the Government." 61
The majority went on to disagree with the arguments advanced by
Delli Paoli and that it's attempt to tie its result to the maintenance of the
jury system.62 The Court found that "there are some contexts in which
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great,
and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practi-
cal and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. '63 The
Court declared that "[s]uch a context is presented [in this case], where
the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant,
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial."' This was especially evident in
the facts of Bruton, in light of the unreliability of the evidence and com-
pounded with the fact that Evans did not testify and could not be tested
by cross-examination.65
The Court acknowledged that there was no way to actually deter-
mine whether in fact the jury did or did not consider Evans's statement
that inculpated Bruton in determining Bruton's guilt.66 It was enough
for the Court that the testimony regarding the confession posed substan-
tial threats to a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. 67 The
Court simply could not "accept limiting instructions as an adequate sub-
stitute for [Bruton's] constitutional right of cross-examination. '"68
Bruton thus created a rule that where the powerfully incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused together
with a defendant, are offered into evidence at their joint trial, the use of
limiting instructions is incapable of preventing the jury from considering
the prejudicial evidence.69 While Bruton was a considerable step for the
protection of defendants' constitutional rights, it left many questions
unanswered. For instance, as Justice White noted in his dissent, the
majority did not leave the courts with a workable standard that could be
used to comply with the Bruton rule. Specifically, this left the question
of redaction unanswered. Redacted confessions quickly became a very
effective way for prosecutors to skirt around Bruton and to admit non-
testifying codefendant confessions in spite of Bruton's "powerfully
61. Id.
62. Id. at 135.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 136.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 137.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 135-36. "[Tlhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
that the practical limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id. at 135.
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incriminating" rule.7"
B. Richardson v. Marsh
Nearly twenty years after Bruton, the Court decided the next case in
this line, Richardson v. Marsh.7 1 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
held that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission, at a
joint criminal trial, of a nontestifying codefendant's confession, even
though the defendant is linked to the confession by other evidence prop-
erly admitted against the defendant at the joint trial, where: (1) the code-
fendant's confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's
name, but any reference to the defendant's existence; and (2) the jury is
given a proper limiting instruction not to use the codefendant's confes-
sion against the defendant.
72
In Richardson, Marsh, Williams, and Martin were "charged with
assaulting Cynthia Knighton, and murdering her four-year-old son and
her aunt, Ollie Scott. '73 Marsh and Williams were tried jointly, over
Marsh's objection.74  At trial, Knighton testified as to the role of each
defendant in the assault and murders.75 In addition to Knighton's testi-
mony, the state introduced (over Marsh's objection) a confession given
by Williams to the police shortly after his arrest.76 The state redacted
70. See Judith L. Ritter, The X Files: Joint Trials, Redacted Confessions and Thirty Years of
Sidestepping Bruton, 42 VILL. L. REV. 855, 858 (1997) (finding that after Bruton, prosecutors
turned to the redacted confession as the avenue of choice for preserving their ability to conduct
joint trials).
71. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
72. Id. at 211.
73. Id. at 202.
74. Id. Martin was a fugitive at the time of trial.
75. Id. Knighton testified that:
On the evening of October 29, 1978, she and her son were at Scott's home when
[Marsh] and her boyfriend Martin visited. After a brief conversation in the living
room, [Marsh] announced that she had come to pick something up from Scott and
rose from the couch. Martin then pulled out a gun, pointed it at Scott and the
Knightons, and said that someone had gotten killed and [Scott] knew something
about it. [Marsh] immediately walked to the front door and peered out the peephole.
The doorbell rang, [Marsh] opened the door and Williams walked in, carrying a gun.
As Williams passed [Marsh] he asked, Where's the money? Martin forced Scott
upstairs, and Williams went into the kitchen, leaving [Marsh] alone with the
Knightons. Knighton and her son attempted to flee, but [Marsh] grabbed Knighton
and held her until Williams returned. Williams ordered the Knightons to lie on the
floor and then went upstairs to assist Martin. [Marsh] again left alone with the
Knightons, stood by the front door and occasionally peered out the peephole. A few
minutes later, Martin, Williams, and Scott came down stairs, and Martin handed a
paper grocery bag to [Marsh]. Martin and Williams then forced Scott and the
Knightons into the basement, where Martin shot them. Only Cynthia Knighton
survived.
76. Id. at 203.
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confession "to omit all reference to [Marsh]." 77 The confession gave no
"indication that anyone other than Martin and Williams participated in
the crime."78 Williams's confession largely corroborated Knighton's
testimony and also described a conversation that Williams and Martin
had as they drove to the Scott home, during which "Martin said that he
would have to kill the victims after the robbery."79 When the confession
was admitted into evidence, the jury was instructed not to use it against
Marsh in any way.8"
While Williams did not testify, Marsh did.8' She stated that she
was going to Scott's house to borrow money so that Martin could buy
drugs.82 In addition, she claimed that while she knew that Martin and
Williams were having a conversation in the car, she could not hear them
because the radio was on and the speaker was right in her ear.83 Marsh
testified that during the robbery she was too scared to flee.84 She also
claimed that "she did not know why she prevented the Knightons from
escaping."85 In her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Marsh "alleged
that her conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and that
introduction of Williams's confession at their joint trial had violated her
rights under the Confrontation Clause."86
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that in
determining whether Bruton bars the admission of a non-testifying code-
fendant's confession, a court must assess the confession's "inculpatory
value" by examining not only the face of the confession, but also all of
the evidence introduced at trial."87 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit concluded that Marsh's Confrontation Clause rights were vio-
lated because Williams's confession became powerfully incriminating as
to the issue of Marsh's intent when linked to other evidence offered at
trial.88
The Supreme Court distinguished the situation in Richardson from
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 203-04; see id. at 203 n.1 to read the redacted confession in its entirety.






86. Id. at 205.
87. Id. at 205-06. The approach used by the Sixth Circuit is also known as the "evidentiary
linkage" or "contextual implication" approach to Bruton questions. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Marsh' petition. Id.
88. Id. at 206. The Court found that "Williams's account of the conversation in the car was
the only direct evidence that [Marsh] knew before entering Scott's house that the victims would
be robbed and killed." Id. (emphasis in original). Marsh's own testimony placed her in the car.
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that of Bruton, finding Richardson to fall outside of the Bruton rule.89
The Richardson Court found that the codefendant's confession in Bruton
was powerfully incriminating because it expressly implicated the defen-
dant as his accomplice.90 In Richardson, however, the Court found that
the confession was not incriminating on its face, but became so only
when linked with evidence introduced at trial.9' The Court then deter-
mined that while it was not reasonable to expect a jury to forget an
explicit statement when determining the defendant's guilt, it was reason-
able to assume that a jury would follow the judge's instructions and not
make inferences from the redacted confession that would incriminate the
defendant. 92
The Court in Richardson then went on to reject the "contextual
implication" doctrine articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.93 The Court found that adopting this doctrine would be imprac-
tical because it would be impossible to predict the admissibility of a
confession in advance of trial.94 The Court also found that this rule
would lend itself to manipulation by the defense.95
The Richardson Court further justified its decision by reinforcing
the advantages of conducting joint trials. The Court stated that joint
trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system because they had
accounted for one-third of federal criminal trials in the past five years.96
The Court also stated that "joint trials generally serve the interests of
justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts, and enabling a more accurate
assessment of relative culpability." 97 Thus, the Supreme Court found
that, in this case, administrative concerns outweighed the prejudice that
the defendant may have received from the admission of her nontestify-
ing codefendant's redacted confession at her joint trial.
Richardson was a drastic limit on the reach of the Bruton rule.
Effectively, the case turned the "powerfully incriminating" standard into
a "facially incriminating" one. Furthermore, the Court declined to rule




93. See id. at 202-09.
94. Id. at 209. The Court argues that this approach is probably not even feasible under the
federal rules. However, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 allows for a pre-trial in camera
inspection by the court of confessions that will be introduced by the prosecutor, in order to
determine whether the defendant will be prejudiced in a way that will require severance of his
trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
95. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 210.
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on other methods of redaction,98 which left those questions unresolved.
In order to comply with Bruton, did a prosecutor have to redact the
defendant's name and any reference to his existence, as was the case in
Richardson, or was simply removing his name from the confession, with
or without substituting something in place of it, sufficient?
C. Gray v. Maryland
Gray v. Maryland is the most recent Supreme Court decision inter-
preting the Bruton rule.99 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority held
that a confession that substitutes blanks'00 and the word "delete" for the
petitioner's proper name, falls within the class of statements protected
by Bruton.'°' The petitioner, Gray, and his codefendant, Bell, were con-
victed of murder at their joint trial. 0 2 Before trial, Bell gave a confes-
sion to the Baltimore City police, stating that he, Gray, and
Vanlandingham had participated in the 1993 beating of Stacy Wil-
liams. 0 3 "The trial judge, after denying Gray's motion for a separate
trial, permitted the prosecution to introduce Bell's confession into evi-
dence" in a redacted form." At trial, "[t]he detective reading the con-
fession into evidence said the word 'deleted' or 'deletion' whenever
Gray's name or Vanlandingham's name appeared."' 1 5 "Immediately
after the police detective read the redacted confession to the jury, the
prosecutor asked, 'after he gave you that information, you subsequently
were able to arrest Mr. Kevin Gray; is that correct?' "6 The officer
replied in the affirmative.107 Also introduced into evidence was a writ-
ten copy of the confession with Gray's and Vanlandingham's names
omitted, leaving blank white spaces separated by commas.' 08 "The
prosecutor produced other witnesses, who said that six people, [includ-
ing Gray and Vanlandingham,] participated in the crime.' 0 9 "Gray tes-
tified and denied his participation," but Bell did not testify." 0 The trial
98. "We express no opinion on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's
name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun." Id. 212 n.5.
99. 523 U.S. 185 (1998).
100. The Court also stated that use of a first name or a nickname descriptions as unique as the
"red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp would also be protected by the Bruton." Id. at
195.
101. Id. at 197.
102. Id. at 189.
103. Id. at 188. Vanlandingham later died before trial.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 188-89.
107. Id. at 189.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 189.
110. Id.
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judge instructed the jury that the confession was evidence only against
Bell, and that the jury should not use the confession as evidence against
Gray."'I The jury convicted both and Gray appealed." 12
The Supreme Court declared that redactions that simply replace a
name with an obvious blank space, a word such as "deleted" or a symbol
or other similarly obvious indications of alteration, resemble Bruton's
unredacted statements so closely that the law must require the same
result.' The Court found that, "unlike Richardson's redacted confes-
sion, this confession referred directly to the existence of the non-con-
fessing defendant.""' 4 The Court declared that "a jury will often react
similarly to an unredacted confession and a confession redacted in this
way, for the jury will often realize that the confession refers specifically
to the defendant."' 'I This would be true even if the prosecutor had not
"blatantly linked the defendant to the deleted name." " 6 The Court dis-
cussed how this type of redaction would not fool any type of juror,
because "a juror somewhat familiar with criminal law would know
immediately that the blank in the phrase refers to a codefendant."' '" "A
juror who does not know the law and who therefore wonders to whom
the blank might refer need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant,] sitting
at counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer."" 8 If this
type of juror hears the judge's instruction not to consider the confession
as evidence against the codefendant, the instruction will provide an
obvious reason for the blank.' I9 A more sophisticated juror, wondering
if the blank refers to someone else, might also wonder how, the prosecu-
tor could argue the confession is reliable, if the prosecutor has been
arguing that the codefendant, not someone else, helped the confessing
defendant commit the crime.'2 °
The Court also noted that the deletion might call jurors' attention
specifically to the removed name, therefore encouraging the jury to
speculate about the reference and overemphasize the importance of the
confession's accusations.' 2' Finally, the Court noted the similarities
11. Id.
112. Id. "Maryland's intermediate appellate court accepted Gray's argument that Bruton
prohibited use of the confession and set aside his conviction. Gray v. State, 667 A.2d 983 (Md.
App. 1995). Maryland's highest court disagreed and reinstated the conviction. State v. Gray, 687
A.2d 660 (Md. 1997)." Id. at 189.
113. Id. at 189.
114. Id. at 192.
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between Bruton's protected statements and statements redacted to leave
a blank or some other similarly obvious alteration, in that they are both
directly accusatory because they function the same way
grammatically. 22
The Court conceded that there were certain differences between
Bruton and this case. Specifically, the Court acknowledged that a "con-
fession that uses a blank or the word delete ... less obviously refers to
the defendant than a confession that uses the defendant's full and proper
name." ' 23 And that in "some instances the person to whom the blank
refers may not be clear."' 24 For instance, the confession might not be
transparent in other cases where the confession uses two or more blanks,
and only one other defendant appeared at trial. 125 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court declared that as a class, these types of redactions are
similar enough to Bruton's unredacted confession so as to warrant a con-
stitutional violation.
26
The Court found that nicknames and specific descriptions also fall
within the Bruton exception, despite the inferential step needed to link
those statements to the defendant in those situations. 1 7 It reconciled
this result with Richardson by stating that "Richardson must depend in
significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference."'
128
The Court found that the inferences at issue in Gray "involve[d] state-
ments that, despite redaction, obviously referred directly to someone,
often obviously the defendant, and which involve[d] inferences that the
jury could make immediately."'
' 29
The Court also found that the policy reasons that were present in
Richardson were not present in this case. Richardson expressed concern
that because redaction of confessions in a manner that would eliminate
inferential incrimination of the defendant would not be possible in many
cases, prosecutors would be forced to abandon the use of confessions at
joint trials.' 3° The Court reasoned that because additional redaction in
cases that use a blank space, the word "delete," or a symbol, normally is
possible, these policy reasons were not present here.' The majority
122. Id. at 194. The Court pointed out that in contrast, the factual statement at issue in
Richardson "differs from directly accusatory evidence in this respect, for it does not point directly
to a defendant at all." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. In Gray, however, the follow-up question asked by the state eliminated all doubt.
125. Id. at 195.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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proposed an example of a constitutionally acceptable redaction:
Consider as an example a portion of the confession before us: The
witness who read the confession told the jury that the confession
(among other things) said,
"Question: Who was in the group that beat [the victim]?"
"Answer: Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys."
Why could the witness not, instead, have said:
"Question: Who was in the group that beat [the victim]?"
"Answer: Me and a few other guys."'1
32
The Court stated that this example was similar to the kind of redaction
seen in Richardson.133 Therefore, the Court felt Gray was consistent
with Richardson because the Richardson confession had no indication of
redaction, omitted all reference to the defendant, and could only be
incriminating to the defendant when linked to other evidence at trial.
134
The Supreme Court in Gray also found that inclusion of these types
of redactions within the Bruton rule could be practically administered by
Courts because it did not require the judge or prosecutor to predict
whether or not Bruton would bar the use of the confession, which was
the main problem with the "contextual implication" doctrine rejected by
Richardson. '3' The use of blanks, the word "delete," symbols, and other
indications of redaction created no risk of mistrial because they are eas-
ily identifiable prior to trial and do not depend, in any special way, upon
the other evidence introduced in the case. 136 The Court found support in
the fact that several circuit courts have interpreted Bruton this way for
many years and no complaint or difficulties have been seen with the
administration of this rule.
137
Gray was a partial victory for defendants' rights. Part of the ques-
tion left unresolved by Richardson was answered, and the Court elimi-
nated the most harmful and violative type of redaction being used by
prosecutors. The Court, however, did not answer the question of
whether the use of neutral pronouns in place of a defendant's proper
name was sufficiently protective of a defendant's confrontation rights.
This lingering problem has become the new thorn in Bruton's side.
IV. LIFE AFTER GRAY
In the two and a half years since the Supreme Court decided Gray,
courts have again faced a Bruton situation that calls for more clarifica-
132. Id.
133. Id. at 197.
134. See id. at 196-97.
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tion. Gray left unanswered, or perhaps unclear, the constitutionality of
admitting non-testifying codefendant confessions redacted in a manner
where neutral pronouns, such as "someone" or "another person," are
used in place of a defendant's proper name. Since the Bruton rule is
imposed on the states as well as on the federal courts, the scope of pro-
tection under Bruton that a defendant in a joint trial receives ultimately
depends upon the jurisdiction they are tried in.
A. Majority View: The Use of Neutral Pronouns and Phrases as a
Constitutional Method of Redaction
Following Gray, many courts ruled that redactions using neutral
pronouns in place of a defendant's proper name fall outside of the scope
of the Bruton rule. Depending on the facts of each case, some courts
have allowed singular pronouns to be used in place of a particular code-
fendant's proper name. Other courts have also allowed plural pronouns
to be used in place of a particular group of codefendants' proper names
or in reference to the confessor's proper name and one or more code-
fendants' proper names.
1. THE USE OF SINGULAR NEUTRAL PRONOUNS AND PHRASES AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL METHOD OF REDACTION
Many courts have found that redactions that use a singular neutral
pronoun and phrases such as "another person" or "someone" in place of
a nonconfessing codefendant's proper name, are constitutional. These
courts offer nonconfessing criminal defendants a lower form of constitu-
tional protection than courts that reject the use of singular pronouns and
phrases.
A host of circuits have adopted this limited reading of Gray. 138 For
instance, in United States v. Logan, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's post-
arrest statements that he planned and committed a robbery with "another
individual" did not violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights. ' 39 The primary argument was that the redacted confession
pointed an accusatory finger directly at him because he testified and
admitted that he was present at the robbery and murder, but argued that
he was coerced.' 40 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit distin-
138. See generally United States v. Smith, 172 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Akinkoye, 174 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Logan, 210 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Vejar-
Urias, 165 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
139. 210 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2000).
140. Id. at 821-22.
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guished this case from Gray on two grounds. First, the court found that
there was no indication that there had actually been a redaction.' 4' Sec-
ond, the court declared that the statement was not "powerfully incrimi-
nating" because it only occurred once and was oral evidence instead of
visual evidence. 142 Thus, in contrast to the situation in Gray, where the
jury was permitted to see a written copy of the confession with the
names omitted, the evidence in this case was orally communicated to the
jury and therefore potentially less damaging. 43
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Akinkoye, held that the use of the phrases "another person" and "another
individual" did not violate the defendants' rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause." The court declared that the Supreme Court has strongly
implied that such phrases do not offend the Sixth Amendment and based
this broad presumption on the Gray Court's proposed redaction. 145 The
court found that the prosecutor in Akinkoye used the same type of neutral
phrase as the one proposed in Gray.'4 6 Next, the circuit court decided
that because the retyped versions of the confessions were read to the
jury, the jury neither saw nor heard anything in the confessions that
directly pointed to the defendant. 14 Sufficient evidence existed to con-
vict both defendants without the confessions. 148 Thus, the court rea-
soned that the motion to sever and the use of the redacted confession
was properly denied."'
In United States v. Verduzco-Martinez, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that no Bruton violation occurred when a police
officer testified to the confession of a non-testifying codefendant and
used the neutral pronoun "another person" in place of the defendant's
name. 1o At trial, the police officer "testified that [the codefendant] told
her that he was being paid by another person to drive the van to Casper,
Wyoming, and that 'another person had paid for the flight from Casper,
Wyoming to LAX.' "151 The defendant argued that his Bruton rights had
been violated because his codefendant's redacted statements could not
refer to anyone other than himself when viewing the evidence as a
141. Id. at 823.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 1999).
145. See infra, for an analysis on the proposed redaction in Gray.




150. 186 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 1999).
151. Id. at 1214 (emphasis on original).
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whole.' 52 The court found that as redacted, the statements did not
clearly violate Bruton because the defendant was not mentioned by
name, alias, or description, and they did not clearly fall within Gray
because no blank spaces or "deleted" phrases were used in the testi-
mony. 53 Unlike Richardson, however, the redaction did not remove all
evidence of the existence of a coconspirator.1 54 Thus, the court framed
the issue in this case to be "whether the substitution of a neutral pronoun
or phrase in place of [the defendant's] alleged alias so closely resemble
the statements in Gray that it violates Bruton's protective rule." '15 5
The court held "that where a defendant's name is replaced with a
neutral pronoun or phrase there is no Bruton violation, providing that the
incrimination of the defendant is only by reference to evidence other
than the redacted statement and a limiting instruction is given to the
jury.""56 If it is obvious from looking at the confession as a whole that
the redacted phrase was a reference to the defendant, then the admission
of the confession violates Bruton, regardless of how the redaction was
accomplished. 57 The court went on to find that the "Supreme Court
indicated its approval of redaction with non-identifying pronouns in
Gray when it asked why the statements could not have been redacted to
read 'Me and a few other guys' instead of 'Me, deleted, deleted, and a
few other guys."" 58
Using this logic, the court then considered the statements in this
case and found the use of the neutral pronoun/phrase "another person"
"did not identify [the defendant] or direct the jury's attention to him nor
did it obviously indicate to the jury that the statements had been
altered."
1 59
The court found that while it "may be possible to infer that the
'another person' referred to Verduzco-Martinez, it was not an inference
that [could] be made by the jury immediately from the redacted confes-
sion alone."' 6 ° The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit then likened
this case to Richardson, in that "[the defendant] linked himself to the
statements in his testimony." '' The court declared that the defendant's
152. See id. at 1212.




157. Id. In support of its holding, the Court cited United States v. Akinkoye, 174 F.3d 451, 457
(4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Vejar-Urias, 165 F.3d at 340; United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d
1117, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Peterson, 140 F.3d 819, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1998).
158. Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d at 1214 (citing Gray, 523 U.S. at 196).
159. Id. at 1214.
160. Id.
161. Id. The defendant testified that: he talked to his codefendant about getting the van from
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Bruton rights were not violated by the admission of his codefendant's
redacted statements through the police officer's testimony. 62
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Gray, state courts have
also held that the use of singular neutral pronouns or phrases in redac-
tions do not violate Bruton's protective rule. 163 In State v. Baines, the
Connecticut Court of Appeals held that the admission of a codefendant's
post-arrest statement to the police that "there is one more person you
should get" did not violate defendant's confrontation rights.' 64  The
defendant claimed that the trial court should have granted his motion to
sever because his codefendant's statement effectively inculpated him in
the crime, in violation of Bruton. 165 The court found that the statement
did not name or incriminate the defendant directly. 66 While the court
acknowledged that the statement inferentially incriminated someone
other than the confessing codefendant, it stated that the jury could only
infer that person was the defendant by linking the statement to other
evidence. 67  Further, the court found that the trial court specifically
instructed the jury that it could use the statement as evidence only
against the person who made it.' 68 Thus, because the "jury is presumed
to follow the court's instructions,"'' 69 the court held that "the defendant
did not suffer substantial prejudice by the admission of the codefend-
ant's statement so as to require a separate trial."' 7°
Similarly, in State v. Brooks, the Louisiana Court of Appeal held
that a redaction where the word "friend" was used in place of the defen-
dant's proper name did not violate the defendant's rights under
Bruton.'7 ' The court found that through its proposed redaction in Gray,
the Supreme Court approved of redaction that "made it clear that the
codefendant had accomplices, but did not call the jury's attention to an
California for him; he was paying his codefendant to drive the van to Wyoming; he accompanied
his codefendant to the travel agency to purchase the airline ticket; he gave his codefendant money
for the ticket to California and for expenses; and he took his codefendant to the airport. Id.
162. Id. at 1215.
163. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 758 So. 2d 814 (La. Ct. App. 1999); State v. S.T. No. 42223-5-
1, 1999 WL 44214 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1999); State v. Baines, 743 A.2d 666 (Conn. App. Ct.
2000).
164. Baines, 743 A.2d at 668.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 669.
167. Id. The court also stated that the Connecticut Supreme Court "limited the application of
Bruton, [finding] that extrajudicial statements or confessions by one defendant which do not
directly inculpate the codefendant are not within the prohibition of Bruton . . . and are
admissible."' Id. (citing State v. Cosgrove, 436 A.2d 33 (Conn. 1980)).
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing State v. Griffin, 397 A.2d 89 (Conn. 1978)).
170. Id.
171. 758 So. 2d 814, 822 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
[Vol. 55:825
CASTING LIGHT ON THE GRAY AREA
obvious redaction."'' 72 The court stated that because the redaction in this
case did not refer to the defendant by his proper name, but instead
referred to the nontestifying confessor's accomplice as his "friend," the
redacted statement comported with the acceptable example used by the
Court in Gray.17 3 Therefore, the court found that the trial court did not
err because the redaction did not fall within the Bruton rule.
174
In State v. S.T.,175 the Washington Court of Appeals found that a
statement redacting the defendant's proper name and replacing it with
the phrase "another person" did not violate Bruton.17 6 The statement
made by a nontestifying codefendant and admitted against both defend-
ants was redacted to read, "[confessor] and someone else had taken the
bike from the victim and someone else had the bike."'77 In holding that
the right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of this state-
ment, the court declared that Gray did not govern here because the code-
fendant's statement mentioned "another person" and was the same as the
"me and a few other guys" statement approved in Gray.'78 The court
felt the statement here did not call attention to an obvious redaction and
was not incriminating on its face.' 7 9 Reasoning that the statement only
became incriminating when the state introduced other evidence linking
the defendant to the crime, the court declared that the statement fell
outside of Bruton's protections.180
2. THE USE OF PLURAL NEUTRAL PRONOUNS AND PHRASES AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL METHOD OF REDACTION
Many courts have found redactions using plural neutral pronouns
and phrases such as "we," "they," or "other people" in place of a partic-
ular group of codefendants or in reference to the confessor and one or
more codefendants to be constitutional. These courts offer nonconfess-
ing criminal defendants a lower level of constitutional protection than
courts that reject the use of plural pronouns and phrases.
Several jurisdictions have held that redactions using plural neutral
pronouns and phrases in place of a group of codefendants or in reference
to the confessor and one or more of his codefendants do not violate the




175. No. 42223-5-I, 1999 WL 44214 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1999).
176. Id.
177. Id. at *2.
178. Id. at *3.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 186 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
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Plater v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that the use of the plural pronoun "we" in a redaction did not
violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 8 2 Plater, Morrison,
Grayson, and Capies were tried jointly after being indicted on charges of
second-degree murder for the beating and death of Thomas Davis. 8 3 A
jury convicted Capies and Plater of armed voluntary manslaughter and
Morrison of unarmed voluntary manslaughter. 184 Morrison and Grayson
both made statements that were admitted into evidence. 185  Plater
objected to the portions of Morrison's statement in which he narrated the
group beating of Davis and used the pronouns "we" and "us."' 86 After
analyzing the holdings of Bruton and Richardson, the court looked to its
decision 87 in Foster v. United States. 88 In Foster, the Court held that:
a redacted statement that does not eliminate all references to the exis-
tence of a defendant, but substitutes a neutral pronoun in place of an
individual's name may be properly admitted at trial, along with limit-
ing instructions, without violating a defendant's right to confronta-
tion, unless a substantial risk exists that the jury will consider the
statement when determining the defendant's guilt.'
89
The court then went on to analyze Gray, where it limited Gray's expan-
sion of Bruton as to apply only to "obvious indications of alteration
[that] facially incriminated a defendant because [the statement's] refer-
ence to his identity could be inferred from the statement itself."' 90
Applying this limited holding of Gray, the court found that the admis-
sion of the redacted confession did not violate Plater's rights under
Bruton as interpreted by Richardson and Gray. 19' More specifically, the
codefendant's redactes statement, containing references to "they" and the "captain," did not
directly or indirectly incriminate the defendant in violation of his confrontation rights); United
States v. Stockheimer, 157 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that nontestifying codefendant's
statements, indicates "inner circle" of members in criminal activity, incriminated defendants only
in conjunction with other evidence, if at all); Plater v. United States, 745 A.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding that the use of "we" in a nontestifying defendant's confession did not violate the
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
that defendant's redacted statement with neutral pronouns such as "we," "they," "someone," and
"others" constitutional).
182. 745 A.2d 953, 961 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
183. Id. at 956.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 959 n.9.
186. Id. "We was all around "A" Street. And the guy Boo [Davis] was walking down the
street. That meant he coming around here so that meant that he giving us a cue that he was gonna
kill us. We walked around the comer and jumped in it Foster v United States. All of us jumped
in." Id. (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 960.
188. 548 A.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
189. Plater v. United States, 745 A.2d 953, 960 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
190. Id. (citing Gray, 523 U.S. at 193-97).
191. Id. at 961.
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court found that there was "no reference to Plater's existence or partici-
pation in the offense because the statements did not introduce the name
or descriptions of individual participants."' 9 2 The use of the pronoun
"we" did not link Plater to the crime because no dispute existed to the
fact that the incident was a group assault.'93 The court declared that the
use of "we" was not prejudicial because the term did not connote a par-
ticular number of people and there was "no symmetry between the num-
ber of alleged perpetrators and the number of defendants on trial."' 194
The court found that use of " 'we' comports with the proposed redac-
tion, 'me and a few other friends.""'1 95 The court concluded by finding
that even if there was an error by the lower court, it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming, independent
evidence of the defendant's guilt.
196
In United States v. Edwards, the Court of Appeals for the Eight
Circuit held that the district court's admission of a nontestifying defen-
dant's redacted confession, accompanied by limiting instructions, was
consistent with Gray. 97 The trial court ordered the confessing defen-
dant's statement redacted to replace inculpatory references to her code-
fendants with several neutral pronouns such as "we," "they,"
"someone," and "others."' 198 The trial, the court repeatedly instructed
the jury to consider each admission only against the declarant. 99 No
defendant testified at trial, but fifty-nine witnesses testified to the
defendants' various out-of-court admissions. 2°
The court found that in Gray the use of the word "deleted" directed
the jury's attention to an obvious redaction, while the use of the pro-
nouns "we" and "they" in this case did not draw attention to the redac-
tion.201 Thus, the court declared that the pronouns in the redacted
confession were not incriminating unless linked to a codefendant by
other trial evidence.2 °2 No further redaction of the statement was possi-
ble in this situation, since, especially "[w]hen an admission refers to






197. 159 F.3d 1117, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 1998).
198. Id. at 1124. "The court also approved the government's plan to instruct its witnesses not




201. Id. at 1126.
202. Id.
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existence of other people without distorting the declarant's state-
ment. ' 20 3 The court found that "[b]ecause joint trials 'play a vital role in
the criminal justice system,' it is important to adopt workable redaction
standards. 20 4 Thus, the court found that the admission of the statements
did not violate the defendants' rights of confrontation.
Several district courts have also found that using plural neutral pro-
nouns and phrases in redaction passes constitutional muster.20 5 For
instance, in United States v. Cambrelen, the District Court for the East-
ern District of New York held that Gray did not require the exclusion of
confessions that were redacted so as to replace the names of the code-
fendants with "guy," "guys," or "the guys."20' 6 The confession of one
defendant, Vazquez, described some of the calls and meetings of the
"guys" prior to the attempted robbery of the warehouse. 0 7 The confes-
sion also referred to the arrival of the "guys" at the warehouse, three in a
van and three in a car.20 8 The confession of a second defendant, Brown,
in substance, described that he met "the other guys" and that three
"guys" got in a van and he and "two guys" got in a car and later arrived
at the location.2 9 The district court instructed the jury were that each
statement could be considered only against the defendant who made it
and not against anyone else.210
The Cambrelen court stated that the "documents had no blank
spaces and no facial indication to suggest that they referred to the other
defendants or had been redacted or altered. 12 t' The court also found
that had the "confessions been 'the very first item introduced at trial,'
203. Id.
204. Id. (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209).
205. See United States v. Colon, No. 97-CR-659, 1999 WL 77226, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 8, 1999)
(finding that the redaction of the defendants' proper names with personal pronouns, such as
"certain members" of the Latin Kings, did not compromise the Sixth Amendment rights of any
defendants); Grasso v. Yearwood, 2000 WL 502849, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2000) (holding that
the use of third party references in redacted statement, such as "us" and "they," did not violate
Gray, because the redacted confession did not contain blanks, deletions, or any symbols to
indicate where the redaction occurred); United States v. Barroso, 108 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that statement in codefendant's redacted plea allocution that he
conspired with "more than one person" was properly admitted); United States v. Massanova,
Crim. No. 98-631-02, 1999 WL 761136, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1999) (finding that nontestifying
codefendant's statement, that "to cooperate he would have to implicate friends," did not violate
Gray because the statement did not facially incriminate the defendant, was not redacted with an
obvious blank or the word "delete," and did not include specific details about the defendant).
206. 18 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).




211. Id. Both confessions were admitted in neat, typewritten form so as to disguise the identity
of the defendants are the fact of alteration. Id. at 229.
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the jurors would have been hardly likely, in the light of the court's limit-
ing instruction, to have considered the confessions as incriminating the
other defendants. '1 2 Until other evidence was admitted, the jurors
would have had a "dubious basis, [but] not an 'overwhelming' basis to
infer that 'guys' referred to the other defendants. 21 3 In conclusion, the
court stated that even if admitting the confessions was an error, it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.21 4
State courts have also endorsed the use of plural pronouns as con-
stitutionally acceptable redactions.21 5 One example can be found in
Commonwealth v. McGlone, where the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that the admission of a codefendant's redacted confession, using
"other persons" instead of the defendants' names, did not violate the
defendants' Confrontation Clause rights.216 The court differentiated this
statement from the one in Gray by finding that the redacted statement in
this case "did not reveal to the jury a specific name or the fact that one
was omitted," as the statement did in Gray.217 The court further
declared that the use of the term "other people" was precisely what Gray
suggested the prosecution should have done in that case. 2"18 The court
interpreted Gray as "precluding the prosecution from offering a state-
ment where the redaction itself is obvious to the jury, thereby drawing
attention to the codefendant.
219
B. Minority View: Neutral Pronouns and Phrases as
Unconstitutional Methods of Redaction
While many courts have expressed the view that neutral pronouns
in redactions of extrajudicial statements do not violate a defendant's
constitutional rights, other courts have found these forms of redaction
constitutionally inadequate. There have been several different
approaches by these courts. Some courts have found that the use of
singular neutral pronouns and phrases in a redaction violates the Bruton
212. Id. at 230 (citing Gray, at 523 U.S. at 196).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 705 N.E.2d 313, 316-17 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (holding
that the admission of codefendant's extrajudicial statement that "we stabbed" the victim did not
violate the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause); Butler v. State, 511 S.E.2d 180,
185 (Ga. 1999) (holding that redaction of six codefendants in confessing defendant's statement,
using the letters A-F in place of the codefendants' names, did not violate the codefendants' rights
of confrontation because the statement did not directly indicate which defendant corresponded
with which letter).
216. 716 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1285-86.
219. Id. at 1286.
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rule. At least one state has found that the use of plural neutral pronouns
and phrases is unacceptable. Certain courts look to whether the extraju-
dicial statement attempts to shift the blame to other defendants, and if
they do so, determine that they are inadmissible. Other courts have
declared that in order to pass constitutional muster, all references to the
defendant's existence must be omitted, as was the case with the constitu-
tionally acceptable redaction in Richardson.
1. SINGULAR AND PLURAL NEUTRAL PRONOUNS As
UNCONSTITUTIONAL METHODS OF REDACTION
A few of the federal circuits have found that the use of singular
neutral pronouns in redaction of extrajudicial statements constitutes a
Bruton violation.220 One such case is United States v. Eskridge, where
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant's
rights of confrontation were violated by the admission of his nontestify-
ing codefendant's confession.221 At trial, neither defendant testified,222
and over Eskridge's objection, the government introduced the written
confession of his codefendant, Pointer.223 The confession implicated
both defendants, but any direct reference to Eskridge was eliminated by
replacing his name with the word "another." '224 The judge instructed the
jury to use Pointer's confession only against Pointer.225 During closing
argument, however, the prosecutor referred to Pointer's confession as
implicating Eskridge.226 The prosecutor immediately caught his error,
and thereafter referred to "another" rather than Eskridge.22 v
The court held that "clearly, the use of Pointer's confession with
the word 'another' in place of the Eskridge's name falls within the class
of statements described in Gray as violative of Bruton. '221 The type of
confession at issue here was addressed in Gray, and the court likened
Pointer's confession with "a redacted statement that replaces a defen-
dant's name with an obvious indication of deletion, such as a blank
220. See United States v. Vejar-Urias, 165 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
codefendant's rights under Bruton were violated when, on redirect examination, a customs agent's
testimony clarified who the identity of "someone" he had been testifying about on direct
examination); United States v. Peterson, 140 F.3d 819, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession was improperly redacted by using the term
"Person X" in place of the defendant's name, in violation of the defendant's confrontation rights).
221. 164 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 1998).






228. Id. at 1044.
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space, the word 'deleted,' or similar symbol. '229  Despite the Bruton
violation, the court found the redaction to be a harmless error in light of
the other evidence offered at trial.
230
In United States v. Logan, a non-testifying codefendant confession
was redacted using the term "another individual" in place of the defen-
dant's proper name. 231 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that there was no indication that there had been a redaction, therefore
Bruton was not violated.232 Judge Heaney, however, in his dissent,
found that the use of "another individual" violated Bruton because it was
obvious to the jury that the "individual" was the defendant.233 Judge
Heaney felt the majority had erroneously applied a "four-corners" analy-
sis to the issue, instead of the standard suggested by Gray.234 The dis-
sent also found that when the detective referred to this "other
individual," it was clear he was talking about Logan, since at the very
outset of the joint trial, the district court informed the jury of the nature
of the indictments.235 Since Roan and Logan were the only defendants
charged with the robbery of Lloyd's Gun Shop, it was apparent to the
jury who the other "individual" was who helped in the robbery, even
without inferential evidence that the mystery person was Logan.236 The
dissent suggested that "an acceptable way to reconcile preference for
joint trials with Bruton's constitutional mandate is to simply remove all
reference to the codefendant in the defendant's confession. 2 37
Some state courts have also found redactions that use neutral pro-
nouns to be inadmissible.238 Georgia is one of these states.239 In Davis
229. Id. (citing Gray, 523 U.S. at 192).
230. Id. at 1045.
231. 210 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2000).
232. Id. at 823.
233. Id. at 825.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. The dissent stated that indictments are not evidence. Thus, when the indictment
linked Logan to the confession, he was not being linked by other trial evidence, but rather by the
ordinary inferences a juror would be expected to make immediately upon hearing the redacted
confession.
237. Id. at 826.
238. See Lopez v. State, No. F96-52769-W, 1999 WL 280716 (Tex. Crim. App. May 7, 1999)
(holding that redacted confession violated Bruton, where the use of the neutral pronoun
"someone" did not fool anyone, in the statement, "I got in the back of the truck and someone,
someone, and Gilbert got in the front of the truck"); In matter of L.A., No. 04-97-00434-CV, 1998
WL 904294, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 1998) (holding that two confessions read back-to-
back clearly reference the existence of another individual with the inclusion of the terms "my
friend," "he," and "his," thereby violating Bruton).
239. See Hanifa v. State, 505 S.E.2d 731, 736-38 (Ga. 1998) (holding that admission of
statements of nontestifying codefendants, replacing defendants names with "someone," "someone
else," and "they," violates the Confrontation Clause, but was harmless error); Collins v. State, 529
S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the use of the terms "anyone else," "anybody,"
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v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia declared the use of "someone"
and "anybody" in a redacted statement of a nontestifying codefendant
violated the defendant's right of confrontation. 24 ° Hill, the defendant,
argued that the admission into evidence of his codefendant Davis's state-
ment to police, which inculpated Hill in the murder, violated his right to
confrontation under Bruton.24 ' The court looked to its interpretation of
the Bruton line of cases in Hanifa v. State,242 where that court held that:
unless the statement is otherwise directly admissible against the
defendant, the Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission of a
non-testifying co-defendant's statement which inculpates the defen-
dant by referring to the defendant's name or existence, regardless of
[whether there are] limiting instructions or of whether the incrimi-
nated defendant has made an interlocking incriminating statement.243
In Hanifa, the Georgia Supreme Court held that despite the use of
generic terms in redaction, such as "someone," "others," or "they," the
jury knew a person's name had been redacted, and therefore admitting
the statement constituted a violation of Bruton. 4 4
In Davis, Davis made a pre-trial statement to the police identifying
Hill as the person who repeatedly shot the victim and Guy as the person
who hit the victim in the head with a gun. 45 The court found that Davis
did not incriminate himself in the statement besides admitting his pres-
ence at the crime scene.2 46 Davis's statement was redacted by substitut-
ing 'someone' and 'anybody' for the names of Hill and Guy.24 7 None of
the defendants testified at trial.2 48
The court found it significant that Davis's statement was admitted
in evidence after the state's eyewitnesses identified Hill as the
shooter.2 49 The court reasoned that the "likelihood that the jury attrib-
uted these actions to Hill [was] increased by the fact that although the
"this other individual," the man," and "this individual" in a redacted confession violated the
defendant's confrontation rights); Cunningham v. State, 522 S.E.2d 684, 690 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the admission of the defendant's improperly redacted statement, using "another guy"
in place of the codefendant's proper name, violated the codefendant's confrontation rights under
Bruton).
240. 528 S.E.2d 800, 805-06 (Ga. 2000).
241. Id. at 804.
242. 505 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. 1998).




247. Id. "As read to the jury, Davis's redacted statement maintained that someone kept
shooting at Ray, someone kept shooting till the gun was empty ... and then someone reloaded a
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eyewitnesses identified three men involved in the murder, Davis did not
implicate himself in his statement or his interview."250 Davis's state-
ment left the jury to choose between Hill and Guy as the shooter. 251 The
court found that since Hill lacked an opportunity to cross-examine
Davis's inculpatory statement this violated his Sixth Amendment
rights.252 The court went on to find that the error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore reversed Hill's conviction. 3
Georgia courts have also rejected the use of plural pronouns in
redacted confessions. 4  In Montijo v. State, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that a redacted statement using "others," "another," and
"other guys" was an impermissible means of avoiding the Bruton.2 5 As
in Davis, the court relied on the holding of Hanifa, and found that while
it was not clear that the "generic terms" used in the statements referred
directly to the defendant, "the jury was notified by the use of the terms
. .. that a name had been redacted, making it similar to Bruton's
unredacted confessions so as to be a constitutional violation.
256
2. AN ANTI-INCRIMINATION STANDARD OF REDACTION
If a redacted statement points an accusatory finger at another indi-
vidual, it may violate Bruton.2 5 1 In United States v. Gonzales-Garcia,
the Western District of Michigan held that a codefendant's redacted con-
fession was not admissible against a nonconfessing defendant under the
Confrontation Clause.25 8 The redacted statement in part said:
Polio and Ed Perez went to the barn. Pollo stated he grabbed Ed
Perez by his shoulder and arm and put handcuffs on Ed Perez. Pollo
indicated Ed Perez was handcuffed behind his back. Pollo stated that
he left the barn to have a cigarette[.] Pollo said Ed Perez was cov-
ered with blood. Ed Perez' [sic] feet were tied together and Ed was
lying on the floor on his stomach. Pollo said he did shake Perez'
[sic] face and grabbed his mouth. While doing this, Pollo said,
"wake up, what's wrong." Polio didn't get a response. Pollo said he
didn't take part in the beating[.] Pollo said there was a piece of duct
250. Id.
251. Id. There was also testimony in the case by an investigator who stated that that this
portion of Davis's interview led him to obtain an arrest warrant for Hill, and that this arrest led
him to recover a gun that was later identified as the murder weapon. Id. at 805-06.
252. Id. at 806.
253. Id.
254. See also Hanifa v. State, 505 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. 1998).
255. 520 S.E.2d 24, 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
256. Montijo, 520 S.E.2d at 29-30 (citing Hanifa, 505 S.E.2d 731).
257. See United States v. Pendegraph, 791 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that
nontestifying second defendant's confession even as redacted to omit references to the first
defendant, clearly implicated the first defendant in violation of the confrontation clause).
258. 73 F. Supp. 2d 819 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
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tape, gray in color, by Ed's head. Pollo said there wasn't any tape on
Ed's face while Polio was there. Polio picked up the tape[.] Polio
said he didn't put the gray tape on Ed Perez. Polio said he didn't
remember seeing a knife. Polio said he didn't bring any weapons in
the barn or take any weapons out of the barn. Polio said he left the
Perez residence[.]
2 59
Based on its interpretation of Bruton, Richardson, and Gray, the
Gonzales-Garcia court found that the proper questions regarding
whether a redacted statement is admissible under the confrontation
clause are: "Does the person who made the statement point an accusa-
tory finger at someone else, and can that person be identified, without
further evidence, as the codefendant?"2 0 The court stated that if the
answer to this inquiry is yes, then the redacted statement is not
admissible.26'
Applying this test to the redaction at hand, the court found two
constitutional deficiencies.262 First, the court found that although the
statement lacked a literal blank or asterisk, a logical blank and asterisk
existed. 63 No reasonable juror could hear and understand the statement
"without understanding that someone's name was being kept out."2"
The court found that the inference that could be drawn in this case was
the immediate type of inference described in Gray.265 Second, the non-
confessing defendant, Alvarez, was the only person who could fit into
the confession as the missing link to the murder, since the government
alleged the two defendants were the only people present when the mur-
der occurred.2 6 6 The court concluded that "the statement at issue in this
case [was] not materially different than the statement in Gray. '267
3. JURISDICTIONS REQUIRING THAT ALL REFERENCES TO THE
DEFENDANT MUST BE OMITTED IN REDACTION
Some courts require that all references to the defendant's existence
be omitted in order for the redaction not to run afoul of the constitu-
tion. 68 People v. Hampton provides an example of a properly and
259. Id. at 822.
260. Id. The court cited United States v. Peterson, 140 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1998) in
support of this test.




265. Id. (citing Gray, 523 U.S. at 196).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., State v. Brewington, 532 S.E.2d 496, 506 (N.C. 2000) (finding no violation of
Bruton where state redacted the confessions to the extent that each defendant's confession
contained no references to the other defendant.); State v. Mercier, No. 95-1-00265-0, 1999 WL
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effectively used redaction where all references to the defendant were
omitted.269 In this California state case, Hampton robbed a Burger King
restaurant and Williams drove the getaway car.270 They were both tried
jointly and convicted by a jury of robbery.2 1' The court admitted into
evidence Hampton's custodial confession concerning his part in the rob-
bery and gave instructions to the jury that it was not admissible against
Williams. 2  Hampton's confession was carefully edited to omit any
mention of Williams or of Williams's participation, and the prosecutor
was careful to avoid using Hampton's statement against Williams.2 73 As
to Williams, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of two other wit-
nesses. 7 4 The court found that because this case so closely resembled
the facts in Richardson, the admission of Hampton's confession in its
carefully redacted form did not violate Williams's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him.275
The state of North Carolina has similarly adopted a protective
approach to Bruton. In State v. Brewington,27' a defendant argued that
allowing the words "Grandma" and "grandmother" to remain in the
redacted offering of his codefendant's confession prejudiced him.277
The state redacted the confession in a way that there were no references
to the defendant by name and complete sentences and groups of
sentences that mentioned, connected, or referenced the existence of the
defendant were removed. 278  The court found that the references to
"Grandma" and "grandmother" in the redacted confession did not refer
to the existence of someone else who was involved in the crime.279 The
court reaffirmed its stance on Bruton by announcing that Bruton and its
progeny would affect criminal trials in North Carolina in the following
manner:
The result is that in joint trials of defendants it is necessary to exclude
100874 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1999) (finding that trial court's redaction of statements to omit
all reference to defendants other than the speaker met the requirements of Bruton, Richardson, and
Gray).
269. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999).




274. Id. at 669.
275. Id. at 672.
276. 532 S.E.2d 496, 509 (N.C. 2000).
277. Id. at 509.
278. Id. at 510.
279. Id. Frances, who is the victim referred to as "grandma," had adopted both the defendant
and his brother, Patrick, as her children. Therefore, she was both their mother and grandmother.
Furthermore, because Brian, the other victim, was Patrick's son, Frances was both Brian's
grandmother and his great-grandmother. Therefore, the references in the redacted confession to
the familial connection when referring to Frances Brewington do not point to the defendant. Id.
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extra-judicial confessions unless all portions which implicate defend-
ants other than the declarant can be deleted without prejudice either
to the State or the declarant. If such deletion is not possible, the State
must choose between relinquishing the confession or trying the
defendants separately.280
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEUTRAL PRONOUNS
As stated above, various federal and state courts have interpreted
Gray in different ways. Some of these courts provide defendants with
stronger constitutional protections than others. Since the right of con-
frontation is a basic constitutional right provided by the Sixth Amend-
ment, should not all jurisdictions afford defendants the same degree of
constitutional rights and protections?
Richardson was the only Supreme Court case that has approved of
a specific form of redaction: redaction that omits all reference to the
defendant's existence. Richardson rejected the "contextual implication"
doctrine, which would have all but eliminated the use of confessions in
joint trials if accepted by the Richardson Court.281' Therefore, the Court
struck the balance in Richardson in favor of judicial economy over
defendants' rights. In the case of neutral pronouns, it is time that the
Court strike the balance back in favor of defendants' rights. Redaction
that omits all reference to the defendant's existence is the only type of
redaction that can satisfy the constitutional mandates of the Bruton rule.
This is because the purpose of the rule is to protect the nonconfessing
defendant from the substantial prejudice that arises from the admission
of codefendant's "powerfully incriminating" extrajudicial statements. If
the non-confessing codefendant or even his existence is referred to in the
extrajudicial statement, then it is beyond the jury's ability to ignore the
judge's instructions to consider the statement as evidence only against
its confessor. This was the message in Gray, although it has been misin-
terpreted and misapplied by many courts in the context of neutral
pronouns.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gray was based on many factors.
However, it appears that many courts that seek to continue to permit the
280. Id. at 507-08 (citing State v. Tucker, 414 S.E.2d 548, 554 (N.C. 1992)).
281. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987). "Contextual implication," or "inferential
incrimination" (as it is referred to by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion in Richardson) would
cause the introduction of a nontestifying defendant's confession to violate the Confrontation
Clause rights of his codefendant, even if it is redacted to remove all references to the existence of
the codefendant, if the confession incriminates the nonconfessing codefendant when linked to
other evidence at trial. The adoption of this principle would probably eliminate the introduction
of a majority of confessions at joint trials because the nonconfessing codefendant will likely be
able to provide this linkage through other evidence, including his own testimony.
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use of neutral pronouns only discuss the factors that support their con-
clusions. First, like blank spaces and the word "delete," neutral pro-
nouns refer directly to the "existence" of the nonconfessing
defendant. 82 Second, neutral pronouns function the same way gram-
matically as Evans's confession did in Bruton, because they are directly
accusatory.283 Third, some courts defend the use of neutral pronouns by
stating that the identity of the defendant who is referred to by a neutral
term, such as "someone," can only be established by linking the state-
ment to other evidence. Thus, these courts find that because Richardson
rejected contextual implication, then this type of redaction is acceptable.
These courts overlook two things. First, in Richardson, the confes-
sion was redacted in a manner that omitted all reference to the defen-
dant's existence. Thus, it was more difficult for the jury to ignore the
instruction and place the defendant in the confession. However, when
the defendant's existence is referred to in the confession, it is much eas-
ier for the jury to perform the impermissible task of substituting the
defendant's name for the "symbol" that stands for their role in the crime.
Second, these courts ignore Gray's answer to this problem. In Gray, the
Court stated that, "in some instances, the person to whom the blank (pro-
noun) refers to may not be clear." '84 However, Gray found that none-
theless, "considered as a class, redactions that replace a proper name
with an obvious blank, the word 'delete,' a symbol, or similarly notify
the jury that a name has been deleted are similar enough to Bruton's
unredacted confessions as to warrant the same legal results." '285 Next, in
Gray, the Court recognized that a juror who "wonders to whom the
blank might refer need only lift his eyes to [the defendant], sitting at the
counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer." '286 In the
cases where the use of neutral pronouns have been found to be constitu-
tionally acceptable forms of redaction, these blanks have been filled
with pronouns such as "someone," "another individual," and "we."
Lastly, Courts often contend that if the confession was the first piece of
evidence introduced at trial, the jury would not be able to immediately
determine the identity of the neutral pronoun. These courts seem to
ignore the fact that the jury undergoes voire dire and listens to the crimi-
nal indictments and the prosecution's opening statements before hearing
any evidence at all. Therefore, as Judge Heaney noted in his dissent in
United States v. Logan, often times, it will be obvious whom the pro-
noun refers to.
282. Gray, 523 U.S. at 192.
283. Id. at 194.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 195.
286. Id. at 193.
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Moreover, the most frequently cited authority in favor of finding
redactions using neutral pronouns to be constitutional is the proposed
redaction in Gray. Many courts have proclaimed that by providing this
example, the Supreme Court was bestowing its blessing on the use of
neutral pronouns. These courts, however, have failed to read the lan-
guage of Gray carefully. The Supreme Court stated: "Why could the
court not instead have said: 'Who was in the group that beat [the vic-
tim]? 'Me and a few other guys.' "287 Reading this proposed redaction
out of context, it seems fair to say that the Gray Court approved of
redaction using neutral pronouns. However, the next line of the case
states: "Richardson itself provides a similar example of this kind of
redaction. 288 In other words, what the Supreme Court really meant by
its proposed redaction in Gray, was that if you omit all references to the
defendants, then the redaction is constitutional. Therefore, the two
codefendants who were originally implicated by the confession by the
terms "deleted and deleted" were no longer referred to in the confession.
Their existence was not referred to by the term "other guys." The term
"other guys" referred to the individuals other than the codefendants that
were originally mentioned in the statement. On the contrary, most
courts have interpreted this redaction to mean that it is permissible to
refer to the other defendants in a neutral way, such as "other guys."
Furthermore, as the Gonzales-Garica court noted, through their
extrajudicial statements, confessing defendants often times attempt to
shift the blame to their codefendants. This argument shares the common
sense of the rationale behind the rule in Williamson v. United States. In
Williamson, the Supreme Court held that the exception to the hearsay
rule for statements against penal interest does not allow admission of
nonself-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader
narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.289 While redacted statements
are not as damaging as the statements in Williamson because they do not
expressly name the codefendant as in the context of the statements
against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, the confessor should
not have the benefit of shifting the blame to his codefendants. In Lilly v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court's plurality opinion found that accomplices'
confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been
defined by Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.2 1' The plurality found
that accomplice statements that shift or spread blame to a criminal
287. Id. at 193.
288. Id. at 197.
289. 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1994).
290. 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999).
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defendant fall outside the realm of those hearsay exceptions that are so
trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to the
statements' reliability.291 Likewise, confessions that are redacted in a
manner where defendants' names are replaced with neutral pronouns are
just as unreliable because they shift the blame to others. These confes-
sions provide an opportunity for confessing defendants to exculpate
themselves at the expense of their codefendants. Their admission hin-
ders the truth seeking function of the court because of the statements'
inherent unreliability. Thus, if all references to the existence of code-
fendants are removed from the statements, this problem will often times
be resolved because the statements will only incriminate their confessor.
Another problem that arises when courts allow for the redaction of
statements through the use of neutral pronouns is that defendants who
291. Id. at 133.
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were not originally implicated in the confession may be prejudiced. For
example, in Floudiotis v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
where a confession implicated a particular defendant and was redacted
to refer to "someone," the codefendants who were not originally impli-
cated in the confession could not elicit testimony that they were not
mentioned in the confession.292 This situation may lead to improper
convictions if the jury relies on the inadmissible evidence and then fills
in the blanks with the wrong defendant. This is yet another situation that
can be cured by the adoption of redactions where all references to code-
fendants' existence are omitted.
Moreover, North Carolina and Georgia have adopted this approach.
State courts usually have a larger number of joint criminal trials than do
the respective federal courts in their state. If states such as North Caro-
lina and Georgia can administer their criminal justice system with the
exclusion of neutral pronouns in redacted confessions, then it appears
that the federal justice system will be able to accommodate this type of
redaction as well. This view is the most protective of the defendant's
constitutional rights. If the Richardson Court found that the contextual
implication doctrine had too high a price for efficient maintenance of
our judicial system, then the remaining balance must be struck in favor
of the defendant's rights by mandating that prosecutors comply with the
method of redaction used in Richardson.
Also, many courts that have found Bruton violations have gone on
to find that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.293 Thus,
the defendant's conviction is not automatically overturned, in spite of
the constitutional violation, usually because there is overwhelming evi-
dence against the defendant. If it is usually unnecessary for prosecutors
to violate the defendant's constitutional rights in order to obtain criminal
convictions against them, then it is only logical that requiring them to
remove all references to these defendants in a redacted confession will
not impede the deliberation of justice.
VI. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
One concern that arises when a court mandates that a nontestifying
codefendant's confession be redacted to remove any reference to the
existence of other defendants is that the statement may be distorted.
292. 726 A.2d 1196, 1213 (Del. 1999).
293. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972) (holding that "[t]he mere finding of a
violation of the Bruton rule in the course of the trial does not, however, automatically require
reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction. In some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt
is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant
by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission
was harmless error.").
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This concern can be remedied somewhat by the adoption of a limiting
instruction. Rule 105 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the lim-
ited admissibility of evidence. Rule 105 states that "when evidence
which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible
as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly."2 94
Continuing with our hypothetical once again, let us suppose that
Stewart played a minor role in the conspiracy to traffic heroin. For
example, suppose say that Stewart and Harry delivered the heroin to
distributors, collected the payments from the distributors, and then Stew-
art and Bob delivered the money to John. Because Stewart was involved
in the conspiracy, he also knows the respective roles of his co-conspira-
tors, and he relates this additional information in his post-arrest confes-
sion. At trial, the judge, after reading this law review article, decides
that redaction using neutral pronouns is unconstitutional and informs the
prosecutor that if he plans to use Stewart's confession at the joint trial,
he must omit all references to the existence of other defendants. The
prosecutor is then faced with the daunting task of redacting this confes-
sion. After careful thought, however, the prosecutor redacts Stewart's
confession as follows: "I was involved in heroin importation. I deliv-
ered heroin to some distributors; then I collected the money from them
and delivered this money." Following the admission of the confession,
the judge might give the following instruction:
There has been evidence that Defendant Stewart may have given a
statement to the authorities. You may consider any such statement of
Defendant Stewart, however, only in deciding the charge(s) against
him and not in deciding the charge(s) against any other defendant.
You may consider the statement of Defendant Stewart in the
charge(s) against Defendant Stewart and give it such weight as you
feel it deserves. You may not consider or even discuss that statement
in any way when you are deciding if the government has proven its
case against any other defendant. Furthermore, you should not imply
anything regarding the number of individuals involved in the activity
that was described in such statement. The statement is a statement
only about the actions of Defendant Stewart, and you are to consider
it only as to his activities. The statement has no bearing on the
actions of any other defendant. Thus you are to draw no conclusions
or implications about any other defendant's actions based on the
statement of Defendant Stewart.2 95
294. FED. R. EVID. 105.
295. Instruction based in part on: KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE &
INSTRUCTIONS § 11.11 (5th ed. 2000).
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VII. A WORKABLE STANDARD
This proposed remedy and jury instruction will allow for the main-
tenance of joint trials in our criminal justice system, while at the same
time affording an accused his constitutional rights. First, the remedy
will need no constitutional interpretation, as the Supreme Court has
already held that redacted statements that omit all references to a defen-
dant's existence comply with the Bruton protective rule. Second, this
approach has already been adopted by some states. For example, in State
v. Brewington, a confession was redacted in a way that there was no
references to the defendant Brewington by name, and complete
sentences that mentioned, connected, or referenced the existence of the
defendant Brewington were removed.296 The admission of the redacted
confession was held to be constitutional under North Carolina's protec-
tive rule.297 Other courts seeking to implement a similar rule need only
look to how states such as North Carolina have resolved their conflicts
in cases like Brewington, to curb potential problems with the administra-
tion of this standard in their respective jurisdictions.
This rule will require prosecutors to work a little harder, and be a
bit more creative when redacting confessions. However, it is their
responsibility to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and solely with the use of admissible evidence. Furthermore, a responsi-
ble defense attorney would offer a proposed redaction that would ensure
that his client fully benefits from this standard. This rule will probably
affect the confessing defendant in the most drastic way, because the con-
fession which at one time might have incriminated many now only
incriminates him. As stated earlier, however, the confessing defendant
should not be allowed to use his redacted confession to shift the blame
to others, even if it incriminates him in part. Furthermore, it was this
defendant who decided to offer these statements in the first place. Since
he offered this evidence, it should only be admitted against him. The
nonconfessing defendant will usually be better off with this rule because
it offers greater protection. If the defendant feels that the suggested lim-
iting instruction might notify the jury that the confession is redacted,
then he can either request a different limiting instruction or not request
one at all.
The question of when and how to admit a nontestifying codefend-
ant confession at a joint trial does not have a simple answer. The solu-
tions proposed in this article might not be practicable in every case. For
instance, there are cases where even when redaction that removes all
reference to a defendant's existence may still violate that defendant's
296. 532 S.E.2d 496, 510 (N.C. 2000).
297. Id. at 508.
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rights under the Confrontation Clause. In People v. Archer, the Second
District Court of Appeal of California held that admission of a nontesti-
fying codefendant's redacted statement, which did not refer to the defen-
dant through the use of neutral pronouns or other symbols, violated the
defendant's right to confrontation.2 98 In Archer, the confessing defen-
dant gave a statement to the police in which he admitted involvement in
the killing. 99 At one point, the statement described how the confessor
stabbed the victim twice in the arm while he held him up and that the
victim was subsequently stabbed eight more times in the chest or in the
stomach. 3° The court found that these portions of the statement left no
doubt that the serious stab wounds were inflicted by someone other then
the confessor. 31 The court held that while the statement was redacted
as much as it could have been, it still informed the jury that the confes-
sor planned the crime with someone else, and that the other person
stabbed the victim at least eight times in the chest or stomach.3 °2 There-
fore, in a case such as this, it seems that the only possible options that
remain would be to sever the trials of the two defendants, use two juries,
or for the prosecutor to refrain from offering the confession. As the
Gray Court stated: "[u]nless the prosecutor wishes to hold separate trials
or to use separate juries or to abandon the use of the confession, he must
redact the confession to reduce significantly or to eliminate the special
prejudice that the Bruton Court found. 30 3
Also, the solutions proposed in this article may not be practicable
when the meaning of the confession is distorted in a manner in which a
reasonable jury would not be able to comprehend its meaning. This
might have been the situation in Brewington, where "the state elected to
try defendants Brewington and McKeithan in a joint trial, while trying
[defendant] Lee separately. 30 4 In that case, it might have been too diffi-
cult to redact McKeithan's confession in a manner that all reference to
Lee's existence was removed. While Lee was tried separately and the
prosecution did not benefit from the possible use of a redacted confes-
sion that would have referred to Lee through a neutral pronoun if Lee
had been tried at the joint trial of Brewington and McKeithan, she was
still convicted at her separate trial. Thus, in this case, both judicial econ-
omy and the defendants' rights prevailed and justice was served in a
constitutional manner. The state was able to try two out of three defend-
298. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 230, 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
299. Id. at 232.
300. Id. at 235.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 236.
303. Gray, 523 U.S. at 192.
304. State v. Brewington, 532 S.E.2d 496, 500 (N.C. 2000).
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ants at a joint trial, neither defendant was prejudiced because their code-
fendant's confession did not refer to their existence, and the state was
able to convict all three defendants.
The solutions proposed in this Comment can, however, work in a
majority of cases. Where these solutions can be implemented, defend-
ants' constitutional rights of confrontation will be upheld. When the
solutions proposed here are impracticable, other viable alternatives exist.
While the Supreme Court, through Gray, has restored some of the force
behind the Bruton rule, it is important that this new interpretation not be
misapplied. For if it is, it may lead to many years of constitutional vio-
lations of defendants' rights under the confrontation clause in both fed-
eral and state Courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Bruton was intended to shield defendants from the prejudice of
uncross-examined evidence that inculpated them. Richardson's disa-
vowal of the contextual implication doctrine weakened Bruton signifi-
cantly because it presumes that, after being instructed by a judge, a jury
will not disobey this instruction and put all of the pieces of the puzzle
together. Richardson presumes that juries can be trusted to follow
instructions in ignoring a non-testifying codefendant's completely
redacted confession when determining the guilt or innocence of a defen-
dant. Gray was a significant step forward towards resurrecting Bruton.
However, if prosecutors are allowed to admit into evidence a non-testi-
fying codefendant's redacted confession that when linked to other evi-
dence incriminates a defendant, and then are allowed to redact that
confession in a way that specifically refers to the defendant through the
use of pronouns, then the government can have their cake and eat it too.
A jury will not be blind to this evidence, and they are not to blame, for
"the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored" by the Supreme Court any longer.30 5 As the Bruton Court
declared, "[w]here viable alternatives do exist, it is deceptive to rely on
the pursuit of truth to defend a clearly harmful practice. '30 6 The harmful
practice is the continued use of redacted statements using neutral pro-
nouns when referring to non-confessing defendants, and the viable alter-
native is to redact the confession in a manner that omits all reference to
the existence of the non-confessing defendant coupled with effective
limiting instructions.
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